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An recent years, analysts and policymak-
ers have voiced concern that public
investment in the United States may be
too low. In response, the Clinton admin-
istration's original economic strategy
emphasized a plan to expand investment
in public infrastructure.
1 Now, however,
the Republican-controlled Congress is
looking for ways to achieve a balanced
budget by the year 2002. When the bud-
get ax falls, will infrastructure programs
be among those targeted for cuts? In
making such decisions, policymakers
need to consider the evidence regarding
the productive effects of public capital on
the U.S. economy.
• What Is Public Investment?
Before examining the relationship be-
tween public capital and private-sector
production, it is necessary to define what
is meant by public investment. Invest-
ment can be defined as the expenditure
of current resources to produce some fu-
ture benefit. In contrast, consumption
expenditures yield immediate benefits.
By these definitions, we would classify
public investment as any type of govern-
ment outlay that provides economic ben-
efits beyond the current budget cycle.
Although it is often difficult to quantify
the benefits of government programs,
there are basically three types of public
outlays that can clearly be labeled as
investment: physical infrastructure pro-
grams, human capital programs, and
government-funded research and devel-
opment (R&D). Infrastructure programs
support the stock of physical public cap-
ital, such as transportation and environ-
mental facilities. Human capital pro-
grams are aimed at increasing the skills
and productive knowledge that people
bring to their jobs. And government-
funded R&D helps to expand the body
of basic knowledge that drives techno-
logical progress. This wealth of knowl-




There are various ways of rationalizing
public investment programs. The stan-
dard "public good" argument states that
the government should provide goods
and services that would Otherwise be
underproduced by the private sector. For
example, a private road-building firm
may undertake too little highway con-
struction because it fails to consider the
economic benefits that accrue to commu-
nities outside the immediate vicinity of
the road. Such logic has also been used to
argue that highway construction should
be funded at the federal government
level, as opposed to leaving these deci-
sions to state or local governments.
Another rationale is that the government
has an advantage over individual firms in
its ability to manage the risk associated
with certain types of investment. The
high-risk nature of R&D projects, for
example, may cause private firms to
Many analysts and policymakers are
calling for increased infrastructure
spending to help spur output and
productivity in the U.S. economy.
However, economic research provides
conflicting evidence on the magnitude
of public capital's productive effect.
While certain aspects of the data sug-
gest that expanding infrastructure
investment would boost private out-
put, it is unclear just how large the
effect would be or whether the eco-
nomic benefits would outweigh the
attendant costs.
devote fewer resources to this activity
than is socially desirable. Finally, public
investment programs may be rationalized
as a means of achieving various social
goals. Job training, for instance, can be
viewed as a way to help reduce income
inequality, since it improves the pros-
pects of higher-paying jobs for the poor.
• The Role of Public
Capital in Production
While all three categories of public in-
vestment are quantitatively significant in
the U.S. economy, this article will focus
on the productive effects of physical pub-
lic capital.
2 In the United States, the
stock of physical public capital is about
one-third the size of the private capital
stock. The "core" infrastructure, which
represents the largest single componentof public capital, consists of streets, high-
ways, bridges, airports, transit systems,
public utilities, and the like. State and
local governments own about two-thirds
of public capital, while the federal gov-
ernment owns the stock of military capi-
tal, which represents about one-fifth of
the total. The collective governments
maintain and expand the stock of public
capital with expenditures financed by
taxes and borrowing.
There are straightforward reasons for
believing that public capital is important
to private production. Our interstate free-
way system, for instance, has dramati-
cally reduced travel time for cars and
trucks, speeding the delivery of raw
materials and finished goods and allow-
ing workers to pursue employment
opportunities farther from home. While
in this example public capital acts as a
complement to private resources, it can
also act as a substitute. For example,
public investment might "crowd out" pri-
vate investment if firms rely on public
capital for productive purposes rather
than expanding their own capacity. Em-
pirical research can help us determine
which effect dominates and whether the
effect is large enough to justify an expan-
sion of public infrastructure investment.
• Long-run Trends in Public
Investment and Public Capital
During the 23-year period from 1947 to
1969, nonmilitary public investment in
the United States averaged 3.5 percent
of GNP. From 1970 to 1992, however,
the corresponding figure was only 2.5
percent, a decline of nearly one-third. In
contrast, private investment as a share
of GNP rose from an average of 19.9
percent to 23.0 percent over the same
intervals. These trends are further high-
lighted in figures 1 and 2, which plot the
ratios of public to private investment
and public to private capital. Both series
have tended to decrease over time, lead-
ing some to conclude that the United
States is currently underinvesting in
public capital.
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• Public Capital and the
U.S. Productivity Slowdown
Between 1947 and 1969, U.S. labor pro-
ductivity (defined as real GNP divided
by total labor hours) grew at an average
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FIGURE 3 LABOR PRODUCTIVITY VS. PUBLIC CAPITAL
Billions of 1987 dollars per labor hour
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NOTE: The public capital and public investment series include government-owned equipment,
structures, and residential components. The private capital and private investment series include
privately owned fixed components (equipment and structures), consumer durables, and residential
components.
SOURCES: The capital and investment series are in 1987 dollars and are from Fixed Repro-
ducible Tangible Wealth in the United States, U.S. Department of Commerce, 1993. Output is real
GNP in 1987 dollars from Citibase. Labor hours are from the LHOURS series in Citibase, which is
based on household survey data.
rate of about 2.7 percent per year. From
1970 to 1992, that rate dropped to less
than 1 percent per year. A substantial
body of economic research has been
directed at identifying the cause of this
so-called productivity slowdown. The
primary evidence for what we will call
the public capital hypothesis can be seen
in figure 3, which plots U.S. labor pro-
ductivity versus the stock of public capi-
tal per labor hour. The downturn in the
growth rate of U.S. productivity that
began in the early 1970s coincides with a
similar decrease in the growth rate of
public capital. Further evidence for this
theory can be found in cross-country
data, which show that differences in the
rate of productivity growth across the
G-7 countries can be partly explained by
differences in infrastructure spending
(see Aschauer [1989b]).
4 It is important
to note, however, that this evidence does
not prove the existence of a causal link
running from public capital to productiv-
ity. Indeed, some researchers argue pre-
cisely the reverse—that the U.S. produc-
tivity slowdown is responsible for the
decline in public capital growth. Such
reverse causation might occur, for exam-
ple, because a slower-growing economydoes not generate enough per capita
income and tax revenue to fund public
investment projects adequately.
The decline in public capital growth is
just one of the many explanations for the
U.S. productivity slowdown. Alternative
theories include 1) a return to "normal"
productivity growth from the unsus-
tainably high growth rates experienced
after the Great Depression and World
War II, 2) changes in demographic fac-
tors that have tended to reduce the qual-
ity of the labor force, 3) a falloff in the
rate of R&D spending, 4) an increase in
the cost of complying with government
regulations (such as mandated pollution
controls), and 5) higher energy costs due
to oil price shocks. While many of the
alternative explanations are intuitively
appealing and can be supported by cer-
tain aspects of the data, proponents of the
public capital hypothesis tend to view
them as piecemeal in nature or theoreti-
cally or statistically flawed.
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• The Rate of Return on Public
versus Private Investment
One way of gauging the productive ef-
fects of public capital is to estimate its
rate of return in terms of increasing the
level of private output in the U.S. econ-
omy. This rate measures the "bang for
the buck" of funds invested in public in-
vestment projects, and can be compared
to the corresponding figure for private in-
vestment projects. After all, an increase
in public investment usually means high-
er taxes or additional government bor-
rowing that may absorb funds which
would otherwise be available to the pri-
vate sector. A government policy of ex-
panding infrastructure investment would
be justified if the rate of return on public
investment were determined to be sub-
stantially higher than that for private
investment
The principle of diminishing marginal re-
turns tells us that as the stock of a partic-
ular type of capital increases, the rate of
return for investing in that capital de-
clines. For example, construction of a
second Golden Gate Bridge would yield
far fewer benefits to the San Francisco
economy than did the original. Hence,
the total size of the public capital stock
plays a role in determining the rate of
return on any additional investments.
The return rate also depends on what is
known as the "output elasticity" of public
capital. Output elasticity measures the
impact that a given resource input (such
as public capital, private capital, or labor)
has on final output (real GNP). For
example, an output elasticity of 0.10 for
public capital implies that a 1 percent
increase in the stock of public capital
would boost real GNP by 0.10 percent.
The actual output elasticity must be esti-
mated using data on output and resource
inputs. For a given resource, a larger
elasticity or a smaller input size will
result in a higher rate of return.
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• The Empirical Evidence
In recent years, numerous empirical stud-
ies have attempted to estimate the output
elasticity of public capital. The results,
which vary widely, are sensitive to the
statistical techniques employed, the sam-
ple period, and whether the data are at
national, state, regional, or industry level.
Table 1 summarizes the results of some
empirical studies which conclude that
public capital has a statistically signifi-
cant effect on private output in the U.S.
economy. Finer breakdowns of the data
tend to imply smaller estimates for public
capital's output elasticity. This might be
expected from a theoretical standpoint,
because the benefits derived from many
infrastructure projects, such as highways,
are not confined to a narrowly defined
geographic area. With finer breakdowns,
this "spillover effect" may not be fully
captured in the data.
The output elasticities estimated by
Aschauer (1989a) and Munnell (1990a)
at the national level (0.39 and 0.34, re-
spectively) are the highest reported in
the literature. In both cases, the estimated
output elasticity of private capital is
about 0.3. These estimates imply that the
rate of return on public investment is
about three times higher than the corre-
sponding private return.
7 Taken serious-
ly, these numbers suggest that tremen-
dous gains can be had by expanding
public investment. However, there are
good reasons for viewing the results
with skepticism.
First, the elasticity estimates in table 1
are based on aggregate data. Thus, they
do not contain much information about
the output effects of specific public
investment projects. For example, the
construction of a concrete sound barrier
along a stretch of highway would be
classified as an expansion of public infra-
structure. Once completed, however, we
would not expect the barrier to contribute
much to private-sector production, as
does a road or bridge. Decisions regard-
ing actual investment spending should be
guided by an examination of the costs
and benefits of individual projects. Barro
(1992) points out that cost-benefit analy-
ses applied to individual public invest-
ment projects do not support the claims
of extraordinary rates of return.
Second, elasticity estimates are sensitive
to the use of alternative statistical tech-
niques for dealing with issues like trends
in the data or omitted explanatory vari-
ables. For example, Aschauer and Mun-
nell employ aggregate time series data in
which the behavior of variables is domi-
nated by trends. The productivity and
public capital series both experienced a
sharp change in trend in the early 1970s
(see figure 3). This coincident shift is
responsible for the large elasticities esti-
mated by these researchers. Thus, we
should be cautious about drawing policy
conclusions from their results because
the numbers are largely driven by what
amounts to a single observation. Ideally,
we need to observe multiple trend shifts
to determine whether the perceived rela-
tionship between productivity and public
capital holds up.
Aaron (1990) and Tatom (1991) show
that removing the effects of the trends
and taking account of possible missing
explanatory variables (such as oil price
shocks) can lead one to conclude that the
best estimate for the output elasticity of
public capital is zero. Holtz-Eakin (1993)
and Hulten and Schwab (1993) reach a
similar conclusion by factoring in the
possibility of missing variables that help
explain output differences among states
or regions.
Flores de Frutos and Pereira (1993) fur-
ther add to the controversy by claiming
that public capital can have a substantial
effect on private output even though the
empirically measured value of publicTABLE 1
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capital's output elasticity is zero. The
intuition for this seemingly contradic-
tory statement is that public capital can
be viewed as impacting the economy's
production process in two different
ways. First, public capital may enter the
production process as a direct input,
analogous to labor and private capital.
This so-called direct effect is what is
being measured by the empirical studies
cited above. Second, public capital may
indirectly affect output by increasing the
productivity of private-sector capital
and labor. Thus, the output effects of
public capital may be subsumed into the
measured output elasticities of the pri-
vate inputs.
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To summarize, while the majority of em-
pirical studies conclude that public capi-
tal has at least some productive effect,
the results seem to vary widely depend-
ing on the choice of research method.
Thus, we should be wary of using these
results to justify policies favoring the
expansion of infrastructure investment.
• The Optimal Level
of Public Investment
What can economic theory tell us about
the "optimal" level of public invest-
ment? One way of assessing optimality
is to construct an economic model in
which the government makes spending
and financing decisions to maximize the
welfare of the average citizen. Using
such a model in a previous study (Lans-
ing [1994]), I find that if public capital's
output elasticity (at the national level) is
0.08, then the optimal level of public
investment is approximately 4 percent
ofGNP. If the output elasticity is 0.34
(as estimated by Munnell [1990a]), then
the optimal level of public investment is
nearly 20 percent of GNP.
From these calculations, we can see that
any conclusions regarding the need to
expand public investment are highly
sensitive to estimates of the critical out-
put elasticity. Given the imprecise
nature of the estimates, it is entirely pos-
sible that a policy of expanding public
investment is not called for, and could
even reduce economic welfare (since
the extra spending must be financed by
higher current or future taxes).
• Conclusion
The controversy surrounding the pro-
ductive effects of public capital is far
from settled. Economic intuition and
certain aspects of the data suggest that
expanding infrastructure investment
would have a positive impact on private
output However, it is not clear from the
empirical studies just how large the
effect would be or whether the economic
benefits of additional government
spending would justify the economic
costs of higher taxes or the increased
borrowing necessary to finance the proj-
ects. In any case, it is not likely that a
policy of expanding infrastructure
investment will produce a miraculous
acceleration in productivity growth.
• Footnotes
1. See Economic Report of the President
1994, U.S. Government Printing Office,
p. 30.
2. For an analysis of the economic effects
of human capital and R&D investment, see
"How Federal Spending for Infrastructure
and Other Public Investments Affects the
Economy," Congressional Budget Office
Study, July 1991. For an examination of the
productive effects of public R&D invest-
ment at the industry level, see Nadiri and
Mamuneas (1994).
3. Sec Economic Report of the President
1994, U.S. Government Printing Office,
p. 43.
4. The G-7 countries are Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom,
and the United States.
5. For a more detailed discussion of the
alternative hypotheses, see Munnell (1990a),
Tatom (1991), Aschauer (1993), and the ref-
erences cited therein.
6. The rate of return on a resource input can
be computed using the following formula:
Rate of return = (output elasticity of the input)
x (real GNP) -r (size of the input). The rate of
return is also referred to as the "marginal
product" of the input.
7. Using the formula in footnote 6, this
return ratio can be computed very simply by
combining the two measures of output elas-
ticity with our knowledge that the public cap-
ital stock is about one-third the size of the
private capital stock.
8. For additional discussion and critiques of
the empirical evidence, see Munnell (1992)
and Aschauer (1993).The Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland and





The Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
and the Journal of Money, Credit and
Banking are jointly sponsoring a confer-
ence on Derivatives and Intermediation:
Theory and Evidence.
The growing derivatives market poses
several challenges for policymakers. The
first is to understand the sources of
financial innovation resulting in the pro-
liferation of these products. What eco-
nomic forces make derivatives viable
instruments? What gains do rational
participants obtain from these contracts,
and why do they dominate transactions
in the cash securities markets? To what
extent does regulatory policy—bank-
ruptcy rules, capital requirements, ac-
counting rules, and deposit insurance—
affect the market? In other words, does
derivative-related financial innovation
stem from changes in the marketplace
or from changes in the regulatory envi-
ronment? The answer is crucial to
understanding both derivatives and
intermediation. The second challenge
for policymakers is to understand how
derivatives impact regulatory concerns
in the areas of bank risk, payments sys-
tem reform, and intermediary powers.
Call for Papers
The conference proceedings will be
published in the Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking, and authors will
receive an honorarium. Prospective con-
tributors are invited to send a completed
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